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The purpose of  this  paper  is  to  show that under some  general conditions  of
agricultural production, new technologies which are  technically neutral  to farm
scale, are  unlikely  to be  neutral in  their impact  on marginal farmers.  A margi-
nal farmer is  one who covers all  costs  including land and labor opportunity
costs  but earns  zero managerial rent.  More specifically it  will be  shown that  a
technological change which causes  the same proportionate increase  in output
across all  farms irrespective  of  their  size,  is  likely  to either enhance or
detract from the  chances of  survival  of marginal farm firms.  A corollary of
this argument  is  that small-scale  biased technologies  are neither necessary nor
sufficient  to  enhance the economic viability of  marginal farms.
Occasionally social  scientists  concerned with the  plight of  small farmers,
both in developed and developing countries,  advocate  that R and D funds  for
agriculture should be directed towards  discovering technologies which are  biased
in favor  of  small scale farming operations.  While this  concern is  obviously
well  intentioned, unless other factors  are considered  in the  allocation of
agricultural research funds,  in particular the characteristics  of  the  farm
output markets,  the resulting technological advances  apparently  favoring smaller
farmers, may  be  detrimental  to  their  chances of  survival.  On the  other hand,
given the appropriate market conditions,  it  is quite possible that  large-scale
biased technologies,  if  inexpensive and easy to  develop and adopt,  may be  the
most appropriate way to assist marginal farmers.
The model developed to  support  these propositions is  presented below.  It
is  a "sector equilibrium" model  in the sense  that  it  includes considerations  of
the equilibrium conditions  in farm output  and input markets.  Most analyses  of
the impact  of new technologies  on farm firms  have considered responses at  the
farm level with particular attention to  potential changes  in the  shape of  the-2-
long run average  cost  curve.  Alternative and approximately equivalent / analyses
have studied  "shifts" in  production surfaces,  as  shown, for  example, by  changes
in  the sum of  Cobb-Douglas production function input elasticities.
While the model developed below and  the  subsequent analysis  appears some-
what mathematical, the  general elements  of  the model,  the  results  and  the policy
implications are  fairly  straight foreward.  On the assumption that  some readers
may wish to skip  the  rigorous mathematical analysis,  the paper will proceed as
follows.  The next section will contain a "rough" verbal description of  the
model and  the most important  results  obtained will be  outlined.  An  attempt
will be made to provide  an  "intuitive feel" for  these results.  In Section 3,
the model will be  rigorously  developed, and the mathematical proofs  of  specific
statements  are  outlined.  Some  mathematical footnotes  to  these  proofs are
relegated  to  appendices.  In the  fifth and  final  section, the  results  of  the
analysis and their policy implications  will  be  discussed.
2.  A Description of  the Model and the Intuition of  the Results
The farm sector  or  sub-sector of  interest is  viewed as  consisting of  a
large number one-man or  one-family farm units.  Each family  supplies its  labor
and farm managerial  talent to  the  farm firm inelastically.  The  two other
farm inputs are  land and purchased inputs.  Irrespective of  whether land  is
owned or rented, it  must earn its  opportunity cost when used within the  farm
firm  otherwise  it will be allocated  to its  best  alternate use.  Purchased
inputs are supplied at  a constant  price from outside  the  farm sector.  Farm
management  talent is  assumed to  have no opportunity cost  outside  the sector  of
interest.  On the  other hand,  the  opportunity cost  of  labor used on  the  farm
is  the going wage rate  in the non-agricultural sectors  of  the economy.  This
wage is  assumed to be  the  same for  all  farm labor units.  The output  of  each-3-
farm is  determined by  the quantities  of  land and purchased inputs  and  the  level
of  managerial talent.  It  is  assumed  that  larger farm units are more difficult
to manage and operate  so  that  there  is  a direct  correspondence between the  scale
of  farm operations and  the  level  of management  ability.  This  "diseconomy of
scale" may also  be seen as  a reflection of  the  inelastic family  labor supply on
each farm.
Viewing  the population of  the  economy  as  a whole,  it  is  assumed that  there
exists a spectrum or  distribution of  farm management  talent within the  population.
Those with relatively  low  levels  of  farm management  talent will find  employment
outside agriculture while those who have a high level  of  farming ability will
be farmers  and will earn positive profits  (i.e.  managerial rents)  as  farmers.
A marginal farmer is  defined as  one who just  breaks even;  in other words after
paying  for  the purchased inputs,  the  amount  remaining out  of  gross  farm receipts
is  just  sufficient to  cover  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  land he uses  and his
labor.  If  gross revenue  falls  then losses  accrue so long as  he  remains in
farming.  Such farmers will tend  to  leave  farming  for better paying jobs  else-
where and  they will release their  land to  alternative more  profitable uses.  On
the  other hand if  gross  revenue of  a marginal farmer increases,  then he will
earn positive  managerial  rents  (i.e.  profits)  and he will no longer  be marginal.
He may  try  to expand his  farming operations  but  in doing so  he  is  likely  to  find
that land rents  (in the Ricardian sense) are  tending to  increase  as  new  farmers
are attracted by  the  higher profits  being earned in farming.  At  least  some  of
these new entrants will become  the  new marginal  farmers.  The model incorporates
an explicit market for  land wherein the  sector of  interest must  compete for  land
with other land users.  This  implies  the  assumption that  the  sector of  interest
is  a significant user of  land.  The market for  labor  generates a constant
alternative wage for  farm labor.  This  implies  that the  farm sector  in  the model-4-
is a small user of  labor relative  to  the  total  labor supply  to  the economy.
The aggregate output  of  the  farm sector  is  sold  in a market characterized
by  downward sloping demand.  In  other words,  if  output  of  the  sector increases,
the output  price will fall.
These are the essential elements  of  the model.  Without giving any specific
form to the distribution of  farming talent and only giving very general  forms to
the production technology,  output demand and  land  supply  conditions,  it  is  possible
to  obtain some very definite and somewhat  interesting  results.  Of  particular
interest in this  case is  the  fate  of  the marginal  farmer as  a consequence of
some change in  the production technology.  The model facilitates  an investiga-
tion of  the impact  on  the marginal  farmer  of  some  change in the  production
environment  because  the  talent  level of  farm managers is  explicitly incorporated
into the model.  Since a marginal manager  is  one who earns zero profits,  the
fate of  the marginal farmer can be  inferred simply  by  observing how the  talent
level corresponding to  zero profits  changes as  a consequence of  some primary
change,  such as  an improvement in technology.
The simplest  type of  technological change to  study  is  one which is  neutral
to scale;  that is,  a technology which increases  the output  of  all  farms  by  the
same proportion.  To maintain simplicity, it  is  assumed that  the technological
change is  adopted by  all farmers  instantaneously  and  at  zero cost.
Using the mathematical model below, it  can  be  shown that  the only  case in
which the impact  on marginal farmers  is  neutral, is when the market demand for
the output  of  the sector has  unit elasticity.  That  is,  marginal farmers will
observe no change in their zero profit  status when a neutral technological
advance  occurs only  if  the elasticity of market  demand for their output  is
unitary.  Moreover, if market demand for  the sector's  output  is  inelastic,  then
marginal farmers will begin making losses  and  so they will move  out  of  the-5-
sector when an apparently  scale neutral  change in technology  occurs.  On the
other hand, if  market demand is  elastic,  the same  scale  neutral technological
change will cause previously marginal farmers  to  move into a positive profit
situation and new entrants will be  attracted  to  the  sector.
This  result is  intuitively appealing.  Consider  an industry which exper-
iences  a costless productivity increase such that  the output  of  all  firms,
regardless  of  size, increases  by  the  same  proportion.  For a given  level of  con-
ventional inputs,  the industry output will expand by  that proportion.  If
the market  demand for  that  output has  unit elasticity, then the  output price
will fall just  enough to maintain the  gross  revenues of  all  firms at  existing
levels.  If  output  demand is  inelastic, price will  fall more  than proportionally,
gross  revenues will fall, marginal farmers will be  "squeezed out",  and  land
rents  will fall.  Average farm size will increase.  Conversely, if  output demand
is  elastic, output price will fall  less  than proportionally, gross  revenues
will rise, new entrants will  be  attracted, and  land rents will  rise.  Average
farm size will fall.
There are  some  extensions  to  this argument which will be  presented in  the
final section.
3.  A Model  of  an Agricultural Sector or  Sub-Sector
The approach used here is  derived from the model of  business  firm size
proposed by Lucas  (1978).  Consider a farm sector or  sub-sector which  is  a
relatively small part  of  the economy so  that the  non-agricultural wage  rate and
the price of  purchased inputs  can be  treated parametrically.  All farm firms
are assumed to be  single man (one family) units with all  labor provided  inelas-
tically by  the farm family to the  farm firm.  Off-farm (part-time) employment-6-
for farm labor is  assumed to  be  zero.  The sector has  to  compete for  land with
other sectors  of  the economy.  Purchased  inputs and  land are assumed  to  be
homogeneous.
Let  the farm production technology, F(a,b),  be freely available  to all,
where a is  the quantity of  land,  and b is  the quantity of  the purchased input.
F( ) is  C2,  increasing and strictly  concave  in both arguments.  That  is,
Fa > 0, Fb > 0, Faa < 0, Fbb < 0, Fab > 0.  While  it  does not  appear necessary
to  the result,  it  is  convenient to  assume that F(.)  exhibits  constant  returns
to scale so that we can write:  F(a,b)  = af(b/a).  Also F  = f(r)  - rf'(r)  and
2 ..  a
r f".
Fb = f'(r)  where r = b/a.  Moreover Fa  =  < 0, F  =  < 0, and
b  aa  a  bb  a
F  rf"  > 0, and so  f(')  is  C2,  increasing  and strictly concave.
Fab  a
Let  there  be  a managerial technology  reflecting  two  elements:  farm
management talent  and "a span of  control" limitation.  Let  the farm management
talent  of  an individual be  x, drawn from a fixed distribution T:R  +  [0,1].  The
"span of  control"  limitation reflects  an assumption that  large scale  operations
are more difficult  to manage to  the  extent  that  an actual output  increase is
less  than that which is technically  feasible.  Let  the  "span of  control"
limitation be given by  g(.)  such  that g:R  +  R  is  C2,  increasing, strictly
concave and satisfies g(O)  = 0.  This means  that  if  an attempt  is  made to
double output  by  some appropriate increase in inputs,  actual output will  less
than double.  For  instance, if  F(a,b) exhibits CRS  then g[F(Xa, Xb)]  =
g[XF(a,b)]  <  XAg[F(a,b)].  It  is  assumed that  g(-)  has  the  form:  g(y)  = ay,
where a > 0 and 0 < B < 1.  Lucas  shows  that  if  the  basic production function
2/ is  linear homogenous  and if Gibrat's  law-  applies, then the assumed form of
g(') is  necessary.  Accordingly the assumed managerial technology has  the
form xc[F(a,b)] B where x is  the managerial talent  level  of  the farmer,-7-
a> 0, 0 <  < 1 and a and b are  the  levels of  land and purchased inputs
respectively.  If  F(')  is  linear homogeneous  the the  output  of  manager  can be
written as:  ax[af(b/a)] B. If  z is  the managerial  talent  level of  the marginal
manager  (= the  cut-off management  level = COML)  then  the total  output  of  the
sector  is  given by:  Nfz xl[F(a,b)] B dT(x) where N is  the  total population
size.  It  should be realized  that  a and b will vary  directly with x so  that
more correctly,  the output  of  manager x should be written as:  xa[F(a(x),b(x))]  .
The necessary and sufficient  condition for  the existence of  a farm firm is
that:
IT  = pxa[F(a,b)]  - bv - au - w > 0  (1)
where p = price of  the  farm output
v = price of  the  purchased input
u = rental value  of  land
w = non-agricultural wage  rate
x = the managerial talent  level
a and b are  the input  levels  of  land  and purchased  inputs
rx = profit  ( = managerial rent)  of  a farmer with talent  level  x.
The supply  of  land  to  the  sector is  given by  the  inverse supply  function
S(L),  where 0 < S'(L)  <  a.  The market demand for  the  output  of  the sector  is
given by  the inverse  demand function P(Q), where -K < P'(Q) < 0.
Resource allocation in  the  farm sector of  interest, is  defined as  a number
z (the COML),  and a pair of  functions  a(x) and  b(x):  +  R  such that
a(x) = b(x) = 0 for  all x < z, and a(x),  b(x)  > 0 for all x > z.  An allocation
is  feasible  if  it  does  not  use more  than the  available resources.  It  is  assumed
that  the farm sector of  interest competes with other sectors  for  land,  and
the number of  farm managers is  an insignificant fraction of  the  total number
of  agents in the economy.  Also purchased inputs  are assumed to  be  available
under conditions of  perfect  supply elasticity.-8-
An efficient  resource allocation in the  sector maximizes  the net  social
value of  the  output  of  the  sector.  It  is  assumed that  there are no externalities
so  that a competitive  equilibrium yields an efficient feasible  allocation.  A
competitive equilibrium is  given by:
Maximize  Y = f  P(Q)dQ - Nfz(vb(x)  +  w)dT(x) - ;f  S(L)dL  (2)
wrt:  z,a,b,Q*,L*
subject  to:  L* - Nf  a(x)dT(x)  > 0  (3)
and Nzxa  LF(a,b)]5  dT(x) - Q* > 0  (4)
where Q* is  the  total output of  the  sector
L* is  the  total land use of  the  sector
The Lagrangian of  this problem is:
M =  Q*P(Q)dQ - NfJ(vb(x) +  w)dT(x) - f*  S(L)dL
+  u[L*  - Nj  a(x)dT(x)]  +  p[Nf  xa[F(a,b)]BdT(x)-Q*]  (5)
z  z
where u and p are  the shadow  (market) prices of  land and  the sector  output
respectively.  Unless otherwise stated, the upper and lower  integral limits  are
- and z respectively.  F[a(x),  b(x)]  will usually be abbreviated to F hence-
forth.  The first  order necessary  conditions  (FONC) for an interior maximum are:
aM  N{vb(z) +  w +  ua(z) - pza[F(a(z),  b(z))]
} =  0  (6)
am  N{-ufdT +  pJxaOFF dT(x)}  =0  (7)
aM  =  N{-vfdT +  pfxaFOFbdT(x)}  =  0  (8)
aM  (Q*)  -p  =0  (9)-9-
aL* E  -S(L*) +  u =  0  (10) a-L*  -
aM_  L* - Nfa(n)dT(x)  = 0  (11)
aM  NaF  dT(x) - Q*  =  0  (12)
The first FONC  (equation (6))  gives  the  break even  condition for  the marginal
firm (i.e.  the COML).  The second and third FONC give the marginal conditions
for  the use of  land and the purchased input.  The fourth and  fifth FONC give  the
shadow  (market) prices  of  the sector output  and  land respectively.  Finally,  the
last  two FONC ensure feasibility  in  the use  of  land and the  sale  of  output.
It  is  assumed that  the second order  conditions sufficient  for  the existence
of  a maximum solution are satisfied.  That  is,  if H is  the  appropriate bordered
Hessian matrix then  H2 I|  > 0,  H3 < 0,| H1 4 1> 0 and  |  5 1 < 0.  If  F(a,b) is
assumed to  be  linear homogeneous  then  it  can be shown  that  the  second order
conditions  are satisfied.
The bordered Hessian matrix from the  above FONC  is:
vb-w-ua  0  -vb-w-ua
z  p
0  pacA  paOD  0  0  -(1-T)  u(1-T)
P
0  pacD  paoSB  0  0  0  V(l-T)
P
H:N  0  0  0  0  0
0  0  0  0  SI  1
N  N o  0
a  -(1-T)  0  0  0
N
-vb-w-ua  1-T)  <1-T)  - -1
p  p  N-10-
where simplifying substitutions  from the first  order conditions  have  been made
and where the following abbreviations  are used:
-vb-w-ua =  -vb(z)-w-ua(z)
(1-T)  =  (1-T(z))
A  - fx[(B-1)F - 2 F  +  F1F  ]dT(x)
z  a  aa
B  E  fJzx[(a-1)F  -Fb 2+  F  -Fbb ] dT(x)
D  E  zx[(-1)FB-2FaFb  +  F-1Fab  ]dT(x)
If  F  (a,b)  is  linear  homogeneous  then  it  can  be  shown,  using  (7)  and  (8)
that:
Fa  f(r)  - rf'(r)  _  u
Fb  f'(r)  v
and  so  r  =  is  independent  of  x.  Accordingly:
A  =F-2(-)F
+ F]dT A  =  f  xF  t[-1)F2 +  FF  JdT aa
z  a
=  fxF - 2 C(B-1)  [f(r)  - rf'(r)] 2 +  r2f(r)f"]  dT(x)
=  {(2-l)[(f(r)-rf'(r)]
2 +  r2f(r)f"}lxF
8 - 2 dT(x)  (13)
Similarly:
B =  {(8-1)[f'(r)]
2 +  f(r)  f"}jxF2 2dT(x)  (14)
and
D =  {(8-l)[f(r) - rf'(r)]f'(r)  - rf(r)f"}xF  -2dT(x)  (15)
=  (l-B)(rf(r)f")  (o  - 1 )fxF-2dT(x)  (16)
where a =  elasticity of  substitution of  F(a,b).  Clearly A and B are negative
while the  sign of D is  indeterminate.  However,  it  can  be  shown that:-11-
(A  - D2 ) =  (8-1) f(r)3 f[txFa-2dT(x)12 (17)
and so  (A  B -D 2 ) > 0.  The sign  of D depends  on the  sign of  (a - 1).
Using these relationships  it  can be  shown that  the  SOC are  satisfied.
If  the  SOC  for an interior maximum are satisfied,  then| H  < 0.
dz
The derivative of  interest  in the  current investigation is  dz
because an increase in a corresponds  to  a proportional increase  in output
across all farm firms.  Applying the  implicit  function theorem and Cramer's
rule we get:
dz  =  .I  (18)
da  H|
where:
pzF  0  0  0  0  a  -zaFo
- u  XA  XD  0  0  -1
a  - -P
- X  D  XB  0  0  0 
a  - -
p'  1
O  o  0  P  o  o 
4  S'  1
I  = N7(1-T)4 O  0  N  N 
O  -1  0  0  0  0
*  U  V  _ 1  o  o  o
aN  p  p  N
where X  =  pca/[1-T(z)] 2 . Evaluating this  determinant:
[  I  =  N4(P'Q*+p)  F  (paS)2 (A B-D2)-S'(1-T)2[(vb+w)B+avD]  (19)12
(A B - D2 ) is  positive  by  the assumption that  the  SOC  are satisfied.
[(vb + w)B + avDJ  can be proven negative if  F(a,b)  is  linear homogeneous:
(vb + w)B + avD  = {(vb + w)  [(B-1)f'2 + ff"]
+ av[(0-l)[f - rf']f'  - rff"]}  fxF-2dT(x)
=  wB + (8-l)avff' fxF  2dT(x)  < 0
Even if  F(a,b) is  not  linear homogeneous,  it  is  likely  that
[(vb + w)B + avD]  is  negative because all but  one term in D is  negative.
Therefore, even though:
{-  pIP  )2  (A B - ) - S'(1-T)2 [(vb + w)B + avD]}
cannot  be proven positive without assuming a specific form for F(a,b),  it  seems
reasonable  to  assume that  it  is.
Accordingly, because  H|  < 0 then:
dz  L=L4  >  <
d  =  ( =  ) 0  if (P'Q* + p) ( =  )  O
H  <  >
That  is:
dz  -1  >
d  =  ( = ) 0  if  E = [P'Q*]  (  = )  -1
<  P  <
where:  E =  elasticity of  market demand for  the  farm output.
Therefore, a neutral technological change will only  be neutral in its  impact
(dz  = O) if  output demand has  unitary elasticity.  A  corollary of  this  is da13
that  if  demand is  inelastic  then  it  is  possible  that  a small-scale  biased
technological change could be  detrimental to  the  continued existence  of
farm firms which are marginal prior  to  the  change  (i.e.  small farms).
Similarly a large-scale biased  technology might improve  the  rents of
marginal farmers provided that  output  demand is sufficiently  elastic.
It  should  be noted that  linear homogeneity of  F(a,b) is  sufficient,
but  not necessary,  for  the  result obtained above.
4.  Discussion
The argument here  is  not  that scale  bias  of  technological change  is irrele-
vant  to  the fortunes  of marginal  farmers but  rather that  considerations of
scale bias  alone are insufficient  to predict  the directional  impact  of
technology change on small farmers.  Also,  the  above analysis  is  consistent with
the proposition that, other  things  equal, technologies  biased in favor  of  small
scale are more likely  to  benefit marginal farmers  than are technologies  less
biased in that direction.  The  analysis warns us  that  no matter what  the scale
bias of  a new technology, benefits  to  marginal farmers  (or any  farmer)  are
not  guaranteed.  On  the  other hand,  if  output  demand is  sufficiently  elastic,
even a technology  change  biased in favor  of  large farms  could  benefit marginal
farmers  by  increasing their managerial  rents.
In addition, the  above analysis  tells  us  that  provided output
demand  is elastic, a neutral  change in  technology will confer  benefits
on marginal farmers;  in fact  all existing farmers will experience an increase
in managerial rents.  Also the model  predicts  that  this will be  accompanied
by new entrants,  some of whom will become the  new marginal producers;  that
is,  their managerial rents will be  zero.  Unless  there are barriers  to14
entry, the model predicts that  no matter how much  technical progress occurs,
marginal farmers will always  exist.
There are a considerable number of  applications  for  this  model.
For instance  an increase in a  would represent  a large-scale  biased tech-
dz  dz nological change.  It  can be  shown that - < 0 is possible although  - > 0
is  most likely.-/
The  implications  of  the above  discussion are important  for  the
process of  allocating agricultural research  and extension funds.  If  one  of
the goals  of  such research is  to  develop and extend  technologies favorable
to marginal farmers,  then elasticity of  demand for  the final  output  is  an
important  consideration.  A technology which may benefit  marginal farmers
when farm output  price  is guaranteed may hurt  marginal farmers when market
forces are  allowed to operate.  There  are also implications  for agricultural
trade policies.  An agricultural sector selling to a protected domestic
market will have an output  demand that  is  less  elastic than would occur
if  the  sector is  internationally competitive.  A technological change may
be detrimental  to marginal farmers  in  the  first  case  but  not  in the  second.
Finally, if  aggregate agricultural output  demand is  price inelastic,
long term technological change which may  appear neutral  to  scale, will  be
detrimental to marginal farmers.  The long  run consequences will  be  fewer,
larger farmers.  In  such cases  consumers are  the  beneficiaries.  It  is
appropriate that agricultural research should be  funded from general  taxes
if  aggregate demand for farm output is  inelastic and  if  the resulting
technologies are neutral to  scale.15
FOOTNOTES
1. The relationship between the two  different concepts of  return to
scale  is  discussed in Hanoch  (1975).  One concept  is  defined in
terms of proportional input  increases and the  other  is defined in
in terms of the least  cost expansion path (which underlies the  long
run cost  curve).
2. Gibrat's  law states  that firm growth  is independent  of  firm size.
See Lucas  (1978)
3. See the appendix  for  the proof  that  the  SOC are satisfied when
F(a,b) is  linear homogeneous.
4. See  the appendix for a proof that dz/dp<0 is  a possibility.
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Assume  the  farm production  technology  is  F(a,b),  and  that  it
is  completely  and  costlessly  available  to  all  who  wish  to  use
it.  F(a,b)  is  C2 ,  increasing  and  strictly  concave  in  both
arguments;  that  is:  F.>O,  Fb>O,  F..<O,  Fbb<O  and  F.b>O.  Let
F(a,b)  exhibit  constant returns  to  scale  so  that  we  can  write:
F(a,b)  =  af(b/a)  = af(r).  f(r)  is  also  C2 ,  increasing  and
strictly  concave.  Constant  returns  to  scale  of  the  production
technology  is  a sufficient but  not  a necessary  condition  for  the
results  obtained  below.
Let  there  be  a managerial  technology such  that  the  actual
output  of  a given  farm  is:  B
x  a [F(a,b)]
where  x±O  is  an  index  of  the  farm management  ability  of  the
farmer,  and  a>0  and  0<(<1  are parameters  reflecting a  'span of
control'  limitation  common  to  all  farmers.  These span  of  control
parameters  represent  the assumption  that  larger  production  units
are  more  difficult  to  manage than  smaller  units  so  that  the  fixed
managerial  input  into the  farm  firm  causes  decreasing returns  to
scale  despite  the  fact  that  the  basic  production  technology
exhibits  constant returns  to  scale.
It  is  assumed  that  each  agent  is  endowed  with  a  managerial
talent  level  x,  drawn  from  a fixed  distribution  T:R+-[0,13.  The
variable  inputs  (a=land  and  b=purchased  inputs)  are  assumed
homogenous.  If  we  assume  a continuum  of  agents,  so  that  the
entire  distribution  of  talent  is  always  present,  then  we  can
envisage  some  allocation  of  resources,  described  by  two
functions,  a(x)  and  b(x),  which give  the  quantities  of  land  and
purchased  inputs  managed  by  agent x.  Obviously  not  everyone  will
be  a farmer.  It is  assumed  that  only  the  best  farm managers will
be  farmers  while  most  agents  in  the  economy  will  work  in  the
nonagricultural  sector  for  a wage rate  w.  Accordingly  there  will
be  some  cutoff  talent  level,  z,  which  separates  farmers  from
nonfarmers.  That  is,  a(x)=b(x)=O  for  x<z  and  a(x),  b(x)>O for
xsz.  It is  further  assumed  that  the structure  of  the  economy  is
such  that  only  a small  fraction  of  agents  are  farmers.
Total  sector  output  is  given  by:
N  x a [  F (  a(x),b(x)  ) ]  dT(x)  (1)
where N is  the  size  of  the  total  population.
It  is  assumed  that  the  demand  by  the  economy  for  farm  output
is  described by  the  inverse demand  function  P(Q,w,N)  where PQ<O,
P.>O,  PN>O.  In the  present  analysis  w and  N are  assumed  constant
and  so  we  will  consider  P(Q)  only.
IFurther  it is  assumed  that  the  farm  sector  of  interest  must
compete  with  other  sectors  of  the  economy  for  land.  All  other
sectors  are  assumed  to  be  in equilibrium  so  that  the  supply  of
land  to  the  farm  sector  can  be  completely  described  by  the
inverse  supply  function  S(L),  such  that  SL>O,  where L  is  the
amount  of  land  used  by  the  farm sector.  In  the  absence  of
externalities,  S(L)  will  reflect  the  social  opportunity  cost  of
land  used by  the  farm  sector.
Finally  it  is  assumed  that  the purchased  input  is  perfectly
elastically  supplied  by  the  rest  of  the  economy at  price  v.
In the  absence of  externalities a competitive equilibrium  will
involve  an  efficient allocation.  A competitive equilibrium  will
be  the  solution  of:
Maximize Y =  P(Q)  dQ  - N j(vb(x)+w) dT(x)  - S(L)  dL  (2)
wrt  o  z  o
z,a,b,Q*,L-
subject  to:
LO  - N  a(x)  dT(x)  X  0  (3)
and  8 
N  x aX [  F(a(x),b(x)  ]  dT(x)  - Q'  0  (4)
z
The  FONC for  an  interior  maximum  solution to  this  problem are:
0
£  =-  N{vb(z)+w+ua(z)-pz(XF(a(z),b(z))3  } =  0  (5)
/iz
i£  a  N(-u  dT(x)  +  p  xa(8  F  F.  dT(x)  =  0  (6)
,a  iz  z
ACf  N(-v  dT(x)  +  p  xa8 F Fb  dT(x)  =  0  (7)
Ab  z  z
AC - P(Q*)  - p = 0  (8)
iQo
A£ S -S(L*)  +  u =  0  (9)
AL"
ETOC  -
L£_  . L* - N  a(x)  dT(x)  =  0  (10)
_  z
2I_  s  N  xa  F  dT(x)  - Q  = 0  (11)
Lp  z
u  is  the  shadow  price  of  land  and  p  is  the  shadow  price  of  farm
output.
The  SOC  are  IH 2 zI,  IH3 |  0,  IH4I,  IHalI  where:
08
-p«F  0  0  0  0  a  -zaXF
0  paS0A  p0SD  0  0  -[1-T]  u[1-T]/p
0  pIfOD  pOBB  0  0  0  v[1-T3/p
0  0  0  P'/N  0  0  -1/N
H=  N
0  0  0  0  -S'/N  1/N  0
a  -1-T]  0  0  1/N  0  0
0
-zaF  u[1-T]/p  vl[-T3/p  -1/N  0  0  0
0-2 2  0-1
where  A =  x [(0-1)  F  F. + F  F..  3 dT(x)  (12)
z
r  0-2  2  0-1
B  =  x [(-1)  F  Fb  + F  Fbb  ] dT(x)  (13)
z
r-  I80-2  0-1
D =  x  [(0-1)  F  F.Fb  + F  F.b  3  dT(x)  (14)
Also  [1-T3  is  an  abbreviation  of  [1-T(z)]  and  will  be  used
henceforth.
To  obtain  H in  the  form  given  above  several  substitutions  from
the  FONC have  been  made.  The SOC  involve:
IH 2 1  =  1  >  0  (15)
IH31  = N p  a0  B + N2 P' {v(l-T)/p}
2 (16)
0  f  because B 4  8  and  P'  0
3IH4
= P  v-T/p  - N
4 P  {v  /p} 2 - N4 S  -T]  p  B
+  N3 P' [1-T]  (v 2A  +  u2B  - 2uvD)  aB/p
+  N2 (paB)2 (AB-D 2)
(17)
0  O  if  (v2A +  u2B  - 2uvD)  c 0
and  (AB-D2) I  0
Recall  that  P'c  0,  B c  0
IHsl  =  - Np P'S'[1-T]2  ( a2{v2A+u 2 B-2uvD}
+2a{vb+w+au}{vB-uD}
+{vb+w+au}2 B  )
- N5 P' a  F  [l-T] 2 a(  (v 2A+u2B-2uvD)
+  N5 P'S'  pa  F  {v[l-T] 2/p)2
0
+  N4 S' pa F  [1-T] 2 pa0  B
0  0
+  (pao) 2 (AB-D2)  [N4P'(zaF )2 -N4S'a 2-N3paF  ]
(18)
6  0  given  P'40  and  BEO  if the  following  conditions  hold:
(AB-D 2 ) ! 0
(v 2A  +  u2B  - 2uvD)  =  E 6  0
and  (a2E +  2aC(vD-uB)  +  C2B ) L  0
where  C = (vb+w+ua)
In  summary,  the  sufficient  conditions  for  the  SOC  to  be
satisfied are:
(i)  AB-D 2 1  0  (A,B and  D are  defined  above)
(ii)  v2A  +  u2B  - 2uvD  =  E  c 0
(iii)  a2E +  2aC(vD-uB)  +  C2B c 0  where  C =  vb+w+ua
The  proofs that  (i),  (ii)  and  (iii)  hold  when  F(a,b)  is  linear
homogeneous  are now  given.
If  F(a,b)  is  linear  homogeneous then  af(r)  =  F(a,b)  where
r=b/a.  Therefore F. =  f(r)-rf'(r),  and  Fb  =  f'(r)  . From  the  FONC,
f(r)-rf'(r)/f'(r)]  =  u/v  and  so r=b/a  is  independent  of  x.
Therefore  we  can  write:
408-1  2
A  =  xF  ((0-1)  F.  +  F  F..  }  dT(x)  (19)
z
f  0-2




B=  ((0-1)  [f'(r)] 2 +f(r)f"(r)}  x  F  dT(x)  (21)
z
Ad  0-2
D =  {((-1)  [f(r)-rf'(r)f(r-rf(r)f"(r)}  x  F  dT(x)  (22)
Accordingly:
[AB-D 2 ] = [ {((-1)(f-rf') 2+r2ff"}{(8-l)f' 2 +ff"}
f-  0-1
-{(-1)(f-rf')f'-rff"}2 ]  [  xF  dT(x)  ]2  (23)
80-2
=  (-1)  f3  f" [  xF  dT(x)  32  (24)
z
> 0  because  (0-1)<0  and  f"(r)<0
qed
and
v2A+u2B-2uvD  = v2[A+(u/v) 2B-2(u/v)D_
(25)
- 0-2











( 0  because f"<O
qed
5Finally:







=  xF  dT(x)  ((f-l)(vaf(r)+wf'(r))
2+w2f(r)f"(r)}
jz  (30)
< 0  because B-1<0  and  f"(r)<O
qed
Therefore  linear  homogeneity of  F(a,b)  is  sufficient  for  the  SOC
to  be  satis  fied.
The  value  of  current  interest  is:  dz  =  JI  where:
da  IHI
pzF  0  0  0  0  a  -zoF
-u(l-T)  pIOA  paBD  0  0  -(I-T)  u(-T)
a  P
-v(l-T)  paOD  paOB  0  O  0  v(l-T)
(  P
J=N
0  0  0  P'/N  0  0  -1/N
0  0  0  0  -S'/N  /N  0
0  -(l-T)  0  0  1/N  0  0
-Q*/aN  u(l-T)  v(l-T)  -1/N  0  0  0
p  p 
6Therefore:
dz  =  (P'B*+p)  {N3zF  (pao) 2(AB-D 2 )
da  IHI
-N4S'  (-T) 20[(vb+w)B+avD)]
(31)
From  the SOC  we  have  AB-D 2 > 0 and  so  if (vb+w)B+avD < 0 then:
(>)  (<)
dz  (=) 0  if  (P'Q*+p)  (=) 0
da  (<)  (>)
That  is:
(>)  (>)
dz  (=) 0  if  e =  p  (=) -1
da ( ;)  P'Q*  ({)
where  E  is  the  output  demand  elasticity.
If  F(a,b)  is  linear  homogeneous  then:
(vb+w)B+avD =
is  0-2




= wB  +  xF  dT(x)  {av(0-l)ff'}
J~~~~~~~~~~~~~~z  ~(33)
<  0  because  B<O  and  0-1<0
qed
Therefore  the  result  dz/da = 0  if  c  = -1 is  established.  Some
insight  into  the  forces  operating  as  a result  of  a technological
change  can  be obtained  by  considering  some more  restricted  cases.
Consider  the  simple case  in which  the  sector  of  interest  is
the  only user  of  land  and  the  output  demand  is  perfectly  elastic.
This  situation  is consistent  with  an  open,  small  economy  with  one
major  agricultural  crop.  A competitive  equilibrium  solves  the
problem:
70  0
Maximize  = N|  (pxf  [F(a,b)]  -vb-w}  dT(x)
wrt.  z,a,b  (34)
subject  to:  L - N  a dT(x)  >  0
jz  (35)
The  FONC  for  an  interior  solution  are:
0
i£  =- -zpF  +  vb  +  +  w +  ua  =  0
Iz  (36)
f-  IN  '  0-1  ?"
it  E  N  [  xpa0  F  F.  dT(x)  - u  dT(x)  =  0
La  z  z  (37)
*  0-1
e£  E  N  [xpa0  F  Fb  - v]  dT(x)  =  0
Lb  z  (38)
E  . L - N  a dT(x)  =  0
Lu  z  (39)
The  borbered  Hessian  matrix  of  interest  is:
-pXF  0  0  a
0  pXA_  pacOD  -[1-T]
K  =  N K=N
0  pa(3D  paBB  0
a  -[=T]  0  0
where  A,B,D  and  T  are  as  previously  defined.
IKI  =  N4 {[(-T] 2p(F  p06B  - a2 (pa() 2 (AB-D 2 )}
(40)
The  SOC  for  a  maximum  require:
(i)  IK 21 =  -N3 [I-T] 2 pax  B_  0
This  is  satisfied  because  BLO.
(ii)  IK31 =  IKI  Z  0
This  requires  B  L 0  (which  is  satisfied)  and  (AB-D 2) - 0
8A  sufficient  condition  for  (AB-D2 )10  is  F(a,b)  being  linear
homogeneous  (see  proof  above)
The  derivative of  current  interest  is:  dz  =  IBI  where:
d0  IKI
0
zpXF  (lnF)  0  0  a




- xpaFbF  (1+BlnF)  dT(x)  pOBD  paBB  0
0  -[1-T]  0  0
Therefore assuming F(a,b)  is  linear homogeneous
a  0-2
161  =  N4p2a2OF  [1-T]  x F  dT(x)
z
- 0-1
(  ff"  xF  (I+BlnF) dT(x)
z
0-1
- zF  (lnF)[l-T][(0-l)f' 2+ff"]}
(41)
The  sign  of  6II  depends on  the  sign  of  the term  in  brackets,
which could  be  positive  or  negative.  Therefore the derivative of
interest  dz
dO  could  be  positive  or  negative.  The  significance of
this  is  that  an  increase  in  the  parameter  0  represents  a
technological  change  which  is  biased  in  favor  of  larger  scale
producers.  If the possibility  of:
dz
dB  < 0  is  admitted,  it  means  that  a
large-scale  biased  technological  change  could confer  benefits on
the managers  of  marginal  firms  in  the  sense that  their  managerial
rents  would  become  positive.
Now  consider  the  most  simple  (and obvious)  case  where  the
sector  of  interest  is  an  insignificant user  of  land  so  that  the
supply  of  land  to  the  sector  (or  subsector)  can  be  assumed
perfectly  elastic.  Also assume  that  output  demand  is  perfectly
elastic  as  before. A  competitive equilibrium  is  the solution  to:
9Maximize  I  =  N  (pxatF(a,b)]  -vb-w-ua}  dT(x)
wrt.  z(43)
z,a,b
The  FONC are:





it  a  N  (xpaO [F(a,b)3  F.  - u  }  dT(x)  =  0
_  - z  (45)
Ir"  f~0-1
t  a  N  {xpaO  [F(a,b)]  Fb  - v  }  dT(x)  =  0
Lb-  ]z  (46)
The Hessian  matrix  of  interest  is:
-paF  0  0
R =  N  0  pfOiA  palD
0  pa(OD  paXB




The  SOC  for  a  maximum  are  satisfied  if  (AB-D 2 )>O.  A  sufficient
condition  for  this  is  F(a,b)  being  linear  homogeneous.
The  derivative  of  interest  here  ist  dz  =  ITJ
dO  IRI  where:
zpa(F  lnF  0  O
a  0-1
T  =  N  - xpaF.F  (l+OlnF)  dT(x)  p0AA  paOD
- xpaFbF  (1+0lnF)  dT(x)  pa(OD  paiOB
z
and  so  dz  =  -z  lnF  <  0  which  implies that  an  increase  in
de
0  causes  the  cutoff  management  level  to  fall.  In  other  words,
in  this  simple  case,  a  technological  change  favoring  larger,  non-
10marginal  farmers  must  also  improve  the  position  of  marginal
farmers  because  new entrants  are  attracted to  the  sector  which
implies  that  positive  managerial  rents  are  being  received  by  new
entrants.  The  intuitive reasoning  behind  this  result  lies  in the
fact  that  even  though  ultramarginal  farmers  receive  greater  gains
from  the  new  technology than  marginal  farmers  (gains are  directly
proportional  to  the  talent  level),  their  response, which  involves
expansion,  has  no  impact  on  lower  talent  farmers  because  the
supply  of  land  in  this  case  has  been  assumed perfectly  elastic.
This throws  some  light  on  the  penultimate case,  where  dz/d8
could not  be  signed.  It would  seem  that  the result  depends  on  the
relative  strengths of  the  0  change  and  the  resulting  land  rent
increase,  which  in turn depends  upon  the  elasticity of  substitut-
ion  of  F(a,b).
The  general  conclusion  from  the  above  analysis  is  that  an
apparently  neutral  change  in technology may  be  detrimental  or
beneficial  to  the  continued  existence of  marginal  firms.  Moreover
a  technolgical  improvement  which  is  biased  in  favor  of  larger,
ultramarginal  farm  firms  may not  necessarily  be  detrimental  to
marginal  farm  firms  because  under  certain  conditions  the
managerial  rents  of  marginal  farmers  may  increase  as  a result  of
such  a  change.  The  factors which  govern  the  actual  outcome
include  the elasticities of  supply  in  input  markets  and demand  in
output  markets.
THE  END  OF  THE  MATHEMATICAL  APPENDIX
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